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Durango Fire Protection v. Troncoso, 98 P.3d 691 (Nev. 2004)1 
 




Appeal from a district court order denying defendant’s motion to set aside a judgment 




 Affirmed.  The Nevada Supreme Court held that (1) the judgment was not a default 
judgment, and thus, the defendant was not entitled to written notice before entry of judgment; 
and (2) the defendant did not show excusable neglect, as basis for relief from judgment. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
In 1999, Fernando Troncoso filed a breach of contract action against Durango Fire 
Protection, Inc., (Durango) and its owner, Julian Montoya.  In March 2000, Durango filed its 
answer to the complaint.   
On June 6, 2001, a discovery conference was held.  Joann Montoya, Secretary-Treasurer 
of Durango, was present at the discovery conference and was informed that Durango was 
required to file a case conference report with Troncoso’s signature before June 29, 2001, and that 
she needed to secure counsel for Durango to do this or Durango’s answer would be stricken.  On 
July 20, 2001, Troncoso filed a motion to strike Durango’s answer for failure to comply with the 
discovery commissioner's recommendation.  That motion, however, was denied. 
In December 2001, Durango’s counsel at the time, J.E. Ring Smith, moved to withdraw.  
In early January 2002, the district court twice continued calendar calls because no representative 
appeared on behalf of Durango. The district court advised Troncoso’s counsel that if a 
representative for Durango did not appear at the next calendar call, counsel could file an 
appropriate motion.  On January 22, 2002, calendar call was held, and no representative for 
Durango appeared; therefore, the district court granted Troncoso’s oral motion to strike 
Durango’s answer and entered judgment in favor of Troncoso. 
Later, Smith, Durango’s counsel, appeared and was advised of the district court’s ruling 
striking Durango’s answer.  At that time, the district court granted Smith’s motion to withdraw 
as counsel and instructed him to inform Durango of the ruling striking its answer and to advise 
Durango to obtain a new attorney if it wished to go forward. 
On February 25, 2002, the district court entered an order granting Troncoso’s oral motion 
to strike Durango’s answer, entering judgment in favor of Troncoso, and granting Smith’s 
motion to withdraw as counsel.  On April 25, 2002, the district court filed a judgment in favor of 
Troncoso in the amount of $15,000, plus $5,975.72 in attorney fees and costs. 
Subsequently, Durango filed a motion to set aside the “default judgment” pursuant to 
NRCP 60(b).  Durango argued that it was entitled to relief from judgment due to mistake, fraud, 
and/or misrepresentation.  In an affidavit attached to the motion, Julian Montoya explained that 
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he had no knowledge of the hearing in which Durango’s answer was stricken.  Julian maintained 
that he and his wife Joann were in the midst of a divorce, and that Joann was doing everything in 
her power to ruin him, including not informing him of Durango’s duties in this case.  Further, 
Julian maintained that he had communicated with Smith about the case. According to Julian, 
Smith told him that he could no longer represent Durango because he had a separate attorney-
client relationship with Joann, but said that he would complete certain aspects of the case and get 
back to him.  Julian claimed that Smith never got back to him, and he was never informed that 
Smith had officially withdrawn.  Additionally, Durango argued that it was entitled to relief based 
on several procedural errors preceding the entry of judgment in favor of Troncoso. 
The district court found that Durango had ignored the case by failing to appear at several 
calendar calls and hearings. The court stated that it was not persuaded by Durango’s argument 
that counsel did not inform Julian about any of the calendar calls.  Accordingly, the district court 
denied Durango’s motion to set aside the judgment. 
On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) the judgment was not a 
default judgment, and thus, the defendant was not entitled to written notice before entry of 





On appeal, Durango argued that the district court’s failure to comply with NRCP 55(b)(2) 
voids the judgment, and as a result, the district court erred in not granting relief from the 
judgment.  The Nevada Supreme Court, however, noted that Durango did not raise this issue 
below, and that it generally will not address an issue raised for the first time on appeal.2  
Nevertheless, the court addressed this issue in order to clarify that the district court had the 
discretion to sanction Durango by entering judgment against it without complying with the 
notice requirement in NRCP 55(b)(2). 
            NRCP 55(b)(2) states that a “party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the 
court therefor,” and “[i]f the party against whom judgment by default is sought has appeared in 
the action, he (or, if appearing by representative, his representative) shall be served with written 
notice of the application for judgment at least 3 days prior to the hearing on such application.”  
Moreover, the Nevada Supreme Court has stated:  “Written notice of application for default 
judgment must be given if the defendant or representative has appeared in the action.  The failure 
to serve such notice voids the judgment.”3 
            The court observed that there is no question Durango made an appearance, given that it 
filed an answer to Troncoso’s complaint and appeared at the discovery conference.  Also, it 
appeared from the record that Durango was not given written notice prior to the district court’s 
decision to enter judgment in Troncoso’s favor.  However, the court concluded that written 
notice was not required because it was not convinced that the judgment entered in this case was a 
default judgment.  Instead, the court interpreted the district court’s action in entering judgment in 
Troncoso’s favor as a sanction for Durango’s continued failure to appear at scheduled 
proceedings.  The court emphasized that the district court has the discretion to sanction parties in 
                                                 
2 See Britz v. Consolidated Casinos Corp., 87 Nev. 441, 447, 488 P.2d 911, 915 (1971) (“A point not urged in the 
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such a manner.4  The court clarified that such a sanction does not require that notice first be 
given pursuant to NRCP 55. 
          After reviewing the record, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in entering judgment against Durango after striking its answer.  Durango was on 
notice that it was required to appear at several calendar calls and other hearings, yet failed to 
appear.  Although Julian argues that he did not actually receive notice of the various 
proceedings, notice was mailed to his address and placed in Durango’s counsel’s file at the 
courthouse.  Because NRCP 55(b) was not implicated by the district court’s actions taken to 
sanction Durango, no prior notice was required and, thus, the judgment was not void. 
            For the same reason, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying Durango’s motion for relief from judgment based on attorney neglect.5  Although the 
district court may relieve a party from a final judgment due to excusable neglect,6 the district 
court has wide discretion in determining what neglect is excusable and what neglect is 
inexcusable.7 
            In Staschel v. Weaver Brothers, Ltd.,8 the Nevada Supreme Court held that attorney 
neglect amounting to misconduct is not properly imputed to the client in determining whether a 
default judgment should be set aside.  Here, however, the court noted that Julian received 
independent notice of the calendar calls.  Also, Smith specifically informed Julian that he would 
be withdrawing due to a conflict with Julian’s ex-wife.  Finally, unlike the attorney in Staschel, 
there was no evidence in the record that Smith affirmatively misrepresented the status of the case 
to Julian.  The court therefore concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
finding that Durango had not established grounds to set aside the judgment. 
             
Conclusion 
 
            The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in sanctioning Durango by striking its answer and entering judgment in Troncoso’s favor.  The 
court further concluded that when a district court sanctions a party in this manner, the notice 
requirement of NRCP 55 is not implicated.   
                                                 
4 See Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Building, 106 Nev. 88, 92, 787 P.2d 777, 779 (1990) (cautioning litigants and 
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